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On page 332 of the published version, in the notes of table 3, the standard errors are described as 
robust but are actually non-robust. A version of table 3 with the correct robust standard errors 
appears below. They also change some of the statistical significance levels, especially in column 
two which moderates some of the interpretation of the difference between scheduled and non-
scheduled elections which is discussed in section 4.2 of the published article.  
 
Table 3. Scheduled and non-scheduled elections  
  
Scheduled election 
Non-scheduled 
election 
Lagged dependent variable  
0.8421 
(0.1043)*** 
0.8027 
(0.1036)*** 
GDP growth 
0.0138 
(0.0621) 
0.0297 
(0.0492) 
Fiscal transparency index X GDP growth 
0.0032 
(0.0101) 
-0.0039 
(0.0072) 
Chief executive election 
-0.3283 
(0.1527)** 
-0.4032 
(0.2438) 
Chief executive election X GDP growth 
0.1098 
(0.0378)*** 
0.1538 
(0.0775)* 
Fiscal transparency index X chief executive election  
0.0869 
(0.0279)*** 
0.1689 
(0.0709)** 
Fiscal transparency index X GDP growth X chief executive election  
-0.0257 
(0.0074)*** 
-0.0406 
(0.0220)* 
General government expenditure 
0.0369 
(0.0134)** 
0.0392 
(0.0124)*** 
GDP per capita 
0.0001 
(0.0001)** 
0.0001 
(0.0001)* 
Unemployment 
-0.0137 
(0.0292) 
-0.0077 
(0.0350) 
Leftwing chief executive 
0.0721 
(0.0911) 
0.0611 
(0.1075) 
Share of population aged 0-14 
0.1770 
(0.1736) 
0.0999 
(0.1789) 
Share of population aged 65+ 
0.1519 
(0.0883)* 
0.1514 
(0.0975) 
Method GMM GMM 
Year dummies  X X 
Number of countries 18 18 
Number of observations  204 204 
Hansen statistics P-value 1 1 
Dependent variable is public employment as a share of total employment.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 *: significance level 0.10, **: significance level 0.05, ***: significance level 0.01 
